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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JODIE DAHL, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
KERBS CONSTRUCTION CORP. and 
EPSTEIN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 910372 
Priority No. 11 
APPELLANT EPSTEIN CONSTRUCTION'S REPLY BRIEF 
Review of an Interlocutory Ruling 
of the District Court 
Defendant/Appellant Epstein Construction, Inc. respectfully 
submits its Reply Brief in these appeal proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH'S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTES DO NOT 
PRECLUDE A NON-PARTY FROM BEING INCLUDED ON 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM FOR PURPOSES OF 
APPORTIONING FAULT. 
By focusing almost exclusively on the special verdict 
provisions of Utah?s comparative negligence scheme, Jodie Dahl 
contends that only the comparative fault of Defendants may be 
determined by the trier-of-fact. In doing so, she excludes from 
consideration more substantive provisions of the comparative 
negligence statutes and the clear and explicit wording of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-27-37, as well. 
As pointed out in Appellant Epstein's opening brief, the 
above-cited section extends beyond apportioning each Defendantf s 
fault to "each person seeking recovery". This key phrase is 
defined in § 78-27-37(3) to be those "seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom 
it is authorized to act as legal representative." (Emphasis 
added.) Due to both its subrogation rights and ability to maintain 
an independent action against other tortfeasors and also as 
"trustee of the cause of action against the third party", an 
employer is indeed a "person seeking recovery", under § 78-37-39, 
who should be included on the special verdict form. Seer UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 35-1-62, under Utah's Worker's Compensation Act. Appellee 
Dahlf s brief totally ignores this other portion of the special 
verdict statute and Worker's Compensation Act provisions. And if 
the Legislature had expressly intended to limit apportionment to 
"plaintiffs" and "defendants" or ever "parties", it could have so 
stated. Instead the term "person seeking recovery" was adopted 
implying that the negligence of others could be allocated. 
Furthermore, the restrictive construction of § 78-27-39 relied 
upon by Plaintiff has been rejected by at least one appellate 
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court, construing an identically worded statute. As also noted by 
Epstein in its opening brief, the Idaho Supreme Court, in Pocatello 
Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc.f 621 P.2d 399, 403 (Idaho 
1980), stated, "While the statute requires the parties be included 
in the special verdict, it does not state that only parties shall 
be included." For a more extensive discussion of the Pocatello 
Industrial Park opinion, please see Appellant Epstein's opening 
brief at Page 10. 
By looking exclusively at the special verdict statute, Ms. 
Dahl also ignores the more substantive provisions of the 
comparative negligence scheme, which expressly limit a defendant's 
liability to its proportionate degree of fault. See, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-27-38 and 40. These sections state, respectively, "No 
Defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount 
in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant" and "the maximum amount for which a defendant may be 
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or 
proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or 
proportion of fault attributed to that defendant". If this Court 
were to reject Appellant's construction of 78-27-39, urged above, 
there would be a conflict between various sections of the 
comparative negligence act and parties such as Epstein Construction 
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would be subjected to liability far in excess of that which 
comparative negligence was designed to permit. 
Not only are the statutes themselves contrary to Appellee's 
position, most of Ms. Dahl's cited cases offer scant support for 
the view that an employer's negligence should not be apportioned by 
the j ury. 
For instance, in Mills v. Brownr 735 P.2d 603 (Oregon 1987) 
(Dahl's brief, Page 10) and Warmbrandt v. Blanchard. 692 P.2d 1282 
(Nevada 1984) (Dahl?s brief, Page 8), the subject special verdict 
statutes limited apportionment to parties to the proceedings. The 
Utah special verdict statute includes all "persons seeking 
recovery", a defined term which is sufficiently broad to include 
employers, when one considers the overall effect of the Worker's 
Compensation Act. 
Other cases relied upon by Ms. Dahl involve third-party 
tortfeasors seeking contribution or indemnity from the employer.1 
But this confuses the principles of contribution and indemnity with 
merely apportioning the employer's negligence. It is without 
serious dispute that contribution and implied indemnity by an 
employer of a third-party tortfeasor are prohibited in Utah as 
^orreia v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.
 r 446 N.E.2d 1033 
(1983); Cordier v. Stetson-Ross. Inc.. 704 P. 2d 86 (Mont. 1979) and 
cases collected at Page 17 of Dahl's brief. 
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being offensive to immunity granted by the Worker's Compensation 
Act. Seef generally, Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co.r 793 P.2d 
362 (Utah 1990). What Defendants/Appellants here seek is something 
far different than contribution and indemnity, which represent an 
actual recovery against the employer. Rather, Epstein only seeks 
this relief so it will only be held accountable for its percentage 
of fault, and not that of another tortfeasor, Ms. Dahl's employer. 
It is thus no surprise that many courts which formerly 
rejected contribution and indemnity against an employer have now 
embraced apportionment of its fault under comparative negligence 
statutes. Among those many jurisdictions doing so are Washington, 
Clark v. Pacificorpr 822 P.2d 162 (Wash. 1991); Colorado, Williams 
v. White Mountain Construction Co.. 749 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1988); and 
California, Mills v. MMM Carpets, Inc., 1 Cal Rptr. 2d 813 (Cal. 
App. 6th 1991). Thus, a ruling in favor of Appellants would not 
run afoul of prior rulings of the Utah Supreme Court on employer 
contribution and indemnity. 
Appellee Dahl is, admittedly, able to direct the Court's 
attention to one or two opinions which support the proposition that 
an employer should not be included on the special verdict form for 
purposes of apportioning its negligence. But contrary to Ms. 
Dahl's brief, these cases neither represent the majority view, nor 
the recent trend of well-reasoned authority. 
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Appellants have cited no less than five cases decided since 
1985, where appellate courts permitted the inclusion of otherwise 
immune parties or employers on a special verdict form.2 
The trend towards permitting apportionment of the employer's 
negligence appears particularly pronounced in the western states. 
By contrast, and almost without exception, cases relied upon by 
Plaintiff originate from the northeast, although no reasonable 
explanation for this dichotomy between regions of the country 
exists. 
POINT II 
APPORTIONMENT OF AN EMPLOYER'S FAULT NEITHER 
OFFENDS IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY OR OTHER 
PURPOSES BEHIND UTAH'S WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION STATUTES. 
Appellee Dahl also claims that adoption of Appellants1 
position on apportionment somehow impairs Albertson's immunity from 
liability, as granted by UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60, contained within 
the Workerfs Compensation Act. As discussed above, however, 
Appellee Dahlf s argument is fatally flawed by confusing immunity 
from suit with apportionment of fault. See, DahlT s brief, Page 15. 
2Clark v. Pacificorp, supra; Williams v. White Mountain 
Construction, supra: Mills v. MMM Carpets, Inc.r supra; Dietz v. 
General Electric Co. . 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991); and, Bode v. Clark 
Equipment Co.. 719 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1986). 
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It is thus not surprising that opinions cited by Appellee at 
Point II of her brief are instances where a defendant tortfeasor 
sought contribution from the employer-tortfeasor. Not a single 
case involves comparative fault principles, likely because immunity 
has absolutely nothing to do with putting an employer on a special 
verdict form with no intent to obtain actual recovery. By the same 
token, apportioning an employer's fault does not offend other 
policies expressed in the Workers' Compensation Act. 
Ms. Dahl primarily argues that if apportionment is allowed, an 
employee would be denied general damages for pain and suffering and 
other losses not fully compensated for by workers' compensation 
benefits. Further, Ms. Dahl claims the employee must still 
reimburse the employer to satisfy subrogation claims. Each point 
is fallacious. First, it must be noted how the employee still 
receives the principal benefits and policies offered by workers1 
compensation, to wit: a speedy recovery without the need to engage 
in protracted litigation and prove employer fault. Apportioning 
the employer's fault only serves to reduce not eliminate the 
employee's recovery against a third-party tortfeasor by that of 
proportion of fault attributable to this other tortfeasor. This 
seems only fair. 
Secondly, there is no reason, either based upon the statutory 
language or common law principles why the employer's subrogation 
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rights should not be reduced by that percentage of fault assessed 
by the jury. As persuasively argued by Appellant Kerbs 
Construction at pages 22 through 24 of its opening brief, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 35-1-62 provides for a system of credits in favor of the 
injured employee against the employer's subrogation lien. There is 
nothing contained within the Workerf s Compensation Act which 
precludes one of these credits from being that proportion of fault 
assessed against a negligent employer. 
It is also helpful to keep in mind that subrogation is a legal 
theory founded upon equitable principles. As Larson describes, it 
is "an odd spectacle to see a negligent employer reimbursing 
himself at the expense of a third party; and several courts have 
barred the employer's recovery on these facts11 when an employer's 
own contributory negligence is at issue. A. LARSON, WORKMAN'S 
COMPENSATION, § 75.23, 14-133 (1990). See alsor Rowe v. Workman's 
Compensation Appeals Board. 528 P.2d 771 (Cal. 1974). Efforts in 
this regard accomplish the important purpose of balancing the 
interests of a third-party tortfeasor with those of the negligent 
employer as mandated by comparative negligence. 
Finally, Appellee Dahl's policy arguments under the Worker's 
Compensation Act overlook the equally important policy concerns 
expressed by the Utah's comparative negligence statutes. The 
equitable solution proposed by Appellants to reduce the employer's 
80804l.mak
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subrogation recovery by that percentage of negligence attributed to 
it by the jury effectively harmonizes the Worker's Compensation Act 
with the comparative negligence statutes. Specifically, a 
defendant is only liable for its proportionate degree of fault, the 
employer's immunity remains inviolate and the injured employee 
still recovers for her injuries, including general damages, any 
reduction being offset by the benefits received through Worker's 
Compensation payments. In order to effectuate Appellants' 
proposal, Albertson's, Jodie Dahl's employer, must be placed on the 
special verdict form for an apportionment of its fault. 
One final public policy concern which is fostered by placing 
an employer on the special verdict form is that of deterring 
negligent conduct. If an employer is not held accountable for its 
degree of fault but need only make his worker's compensation 
payments in order to recover full subrogation, there is little if 
any reason for parties such as Albertson's to take reasonable 
precautions to protect employees. Our facts present a classic 
example of exposing workers to dangerous conditions in their place 
of employment. Perhaps if Albertson's knew subrogation would be 
limited by its own negligence, reasonable precautions would have 
been taken to avoid employee injuries. This would of course 
benefit employees and employers, but the worker's compensation 
system as well. 
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CONCLUSION 
In her brief, Jodie Dahl has failed to show why her employer, 
Albertson's, should not be placed on the special verdict form for 
purposes of determining its proportionate degree of fault. Neither 
the statutes in question nor other authority support her position. 
Policy concerns also favor reducing a recovery against Appellants 
by that degree of negligence attributable to the employer 
tortfeasor coupled with a protanto reduction in its subrogation 
claim. 
Based on the above, this Court should reverse the ruling of 
the district court excluding plaintiff's employer from the special 
verdict form and remand for a trial in accord therewith. 
DATED this £2'1 da¥-Qf April, 1992. 
Michael A. Katz 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C. 
39 Post Office Place, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2104 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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